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Well-being and Desire

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Duration: 0:30:54 | Added: 08 Jul 2013
I address the question of what constitutes an addition to well-being. Perhaps under specifiable conditions what someone desires is pivotal to what should be done, even if fulfilment of the desires does not add to that person's well-being.

My paper will start by addressing the question of what constitutes an addition to well-being. Like Joseph Raz and many others, I am persuaded by various examples that the fulfilment of a person's desires, as such, does not constitute an addition to well-being. After criticising Raz's account of well-being, I turn to the question of whether, even if the fulfilment of a person's desires does not as such constitute an addition to well-being, other people are nevertheless morally required to do what that person desires. Under specifiable conditions, what someone desires is pivotal to what should be done, even when the fulfilment of the person's desires does not constitute an addition to that person's (or anyone else's) well-being.

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