2. Overview, Theory of Ideas, and Faculty Psychology |
Second lecture in Peter Millican's series on Hume's Central Principles. |
Peter Millican |
14 August, 2012 |
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1. Historical Background, and His 'Chief Argument' |
First lecture on David Hume's Central Principles; focusing on the historical background and Hume's Chief Argument. |
Peter Millican |
14 August, 2012 |
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5. Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy |
Accompanying slides for Lectures 5a to 5c of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature Book One. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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4. Of Knowledge and Probability |
Accompanying slides for Lectures 4a to 4f of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature Book One. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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3. Abstract Ideas, Space and Time |
Accompanying slides for Lectures 3a to 3c of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature Book One. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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1. Introduction, Hume's Theory of Ideas and the Faculties |
Accompanying Slides for Lectures 1a to 1c of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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5c. Of the Ancient and Modern Philosophies |
Third and Final part of Lecture 5 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of the Skeptical and Other Systems of Philosophy. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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5b. Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses |
Second part of Lecture 5 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of the Skeptical and Other Systems of Philosophy. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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5a. Of Skepticism with Regard to Reason |
First part of Lecture 5 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of the Skeptical and Other Systems of Philosophy. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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4f. The Point of Hume's Analysis of Causation |
Sixth part of Lecture 4 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of Knowledge and Probability. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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4e. Understanding Hume on Causation |
Fifth part of Lecture 4 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of Knowledge and Probability. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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4d. Of the Necessary Connection |
Fourth part of Lecture 4 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of Knowledge and Probability. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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4c. Belief and Probability |
Third part of Lecture 4 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of Knowledge and Probability. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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4b. The Argument Concerning Induction |
Second part of Lecture 4 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of Knowledge and Probability. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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4a. Relations, and a Detour to the Causal Maxim |
First part of Lecture 4 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Of Knowledge and Probability. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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3b. Space and Time |
Second part of Lecture 3 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Abstract Ideas, Space and Time. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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3a. Hume's Theory of General (or Abstract) Ideas |
First part of Lecture 3 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. Abstract Ideas, Space and Time. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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2. Hume's Theory of Relations |
Lecture 2 of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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1c. Hume's Faculty Psychology |
Third part of lecture one of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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1b. The Theory of Ideas |
Second part of lecture one of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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1a. Hume's Theory of Ideas and the Faculties |
First part of lecture one of Peter Millican's series on David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature Book One. |
Peter Millican |
1 August, 2012 |
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8. Faith and Pascal's Wager |
Eighth and final lecture in the Philosophy of Religion lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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7. Arguments against the Existence of God - The Problem of Evil |
Seventh lecture in the Philosophy of Religion lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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6. Arguments for the Existence of God - Religious Experience and Miracles |
Sixth lecture in the Philosophy of Religion lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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5. Arguments for the Existence of God -The Design Argument |
Fifth lecture in the Philosophy of Religion lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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4. Arguments for the Existence of God - The Ontological and Cosmological Arguments |
Fourth lecture in the Philosophy of Religion lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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3. The Accidental Properties of God |
Third lecture in the Philosophy of Religion lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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2. The Essential Properties of God (continued) |
Second lecture in the Philosophy of Religion lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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1. The Essential Properties of God |
First lecture in the Philosophy of Religion Lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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Overview of the Philosophy of Religion Lecture Series (Handout) |
Introductory document for the Philosophy of Religion lecture series. |
TJ Mawson |
2 May, 2012 |
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A Platonic Theory of Truthmaking |
Berman (St Louis Univ.) lays out and defends a platonic explanation of non-modal and modal truths using Forms as their truthmakers. He argues that this platonic theory is parsimonious, naturalistic, and ontologically serious. |
Scott Berman |
6 March, 2012 |
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Objective and Subjective Powers and Dispositions |
Kistler (Sorbonne) introduces a distinction between powers and dispositions: A 'multi-track disposition' manifests itself in different ways Mi in different triggering circumstances Ti. |
Max Kistler |
6 March, 2012 |
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Limitations of Power |
Bird (Bristol) warns against overextending the case for a powers ontology, arguing that it cannot answer typical questions outside fundamental metaphysics, for example concerning the analysis of causal statements. |
Alexander Bird |
15 February, 2012 |
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Mutual Manifestations and Martin's Two Triangles |
Mumford (Nottingham) argues that although superior to a stimulus-response model, Martin's mutual manifestation model must be amended to resemble less mereological composition and more causation. |
Stephen Mumford |
15 February, 2012 |
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Identity, Individuality and Discernibility |
Ladyman (Bristol) explains the recent debates about the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and results about weak discernibility. He considers their implications for structuralism and the light they shed on ontological dependence. |
James Ladyman |
15 February, 2012 |
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Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies |
Van Inwagen (Notre Dame) argues that relational ontologies (denying properties can be constituents of particulars) are preferable to constituent ontologies (holding properties are constituents of the particulars that have them). |
Peter Van Inwagen |
15 February, 2012 |
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Is causation a relation? |
Jacobs (St. Louis Univ.) explores the view that between a substance and its power, on one hand, and the result of the substance manifesting its power, there is no relation at all. Thus, causal, relational truths have non-relational ontological grounds. |
Jonathan Jacobs |
15 February, 2012 |
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Neuroscience Can Tell Us About Morality |
What can science tell us about morality? Many philosophers would say, 'nothing at all'. Facts don't imply values, they say. you need further argument to move from facts about us and about the world to conclusions about what we ought to do. |
Patricia Churchland |
3 February, 2012 |
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Brain Chemistry and Moral Decision-Making |
Answers to moral questions, it seems, depend on how much serotonin there is flowing through your brain. In the future might we be able to alter people's moral behaviour with concoctions of chemicals? |
Molly Crocket |
4 January, 2012 |
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Responsibility |
If someone caught me shoplifting, and I was later diagnosed with kleptomania, should I be held responsible? Should I be blamed? |
Hanna Pickard |
1 December, 2011 |
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Selling Organs |
Everyday people die in hospitals because there aren't enough organs available for transplant. In most countries of the world - though not all - it is illegal to sell organs. |
Tim Lewens |
1 November, 2011 |
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Bio-Ethics Bites |
Demand for health care is infinite, but money is finite. So how should we distribute resources? Whom should we help, and why? |
Jonathan Wolf |
3 October, 2011 |
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Trust |
Radically new techniques are opening up exciting possibilities for those working in health care - for psychiatrists, doctors, surgeons; the option to clone human beings, to give just one example. |
Onora O'Neill |
1 September, 2011 |
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4. Arguments from Harm |
James Grant, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, discusses arguments that claim citizens of rich countries are responsible for harming poor people in other countries. |
James Grant |
8 August, 2011 |
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3. Arguments from Distributive Justice |
James Grant, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, discusses the debate over whether distributive justice requires that well-off people do something about poverty in other countries. |
James Grant |
8 August, 2011 |
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2. Arguments from Beneficence, Part 2 |
James Grant, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, discusses objections to the belief that well-off people have extremely demanding obligations to poor people in other countries. |
James Grant |
8 August, 2011 |
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1. Arguments from Beneficence, Part 1 |
James Grant, Lecturer in Philosophy at Oxford University, introduces some of the key concepts in philosophical debates about global poverty. |
James Grant |
8 August, 2011 |
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Status Quo Bias |
Suppose a genetic engineering breakthrough made it simple, safe and cheap to increase people's intelligence. |
Nick Bostrom |
1 August, 2011 |
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4. Metaphor and Art |
James Grant, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, discusses the use of metaphor to describe music and other artworks. |
James Grant |
4 July, 2011 |
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3. Speaking in Metaphor |
James Grant, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, discusses the question of how we succeed in communicating to others with metaphor. He also examines the question of whether all metaphors can be paraphrased. |
James Grant |
4 July, 2011 |
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2. How Metaphors Mean |
James Grant, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, discusses different theories about what gives metaphors the special meaning or content they have. |
James Grant |
4 July, 2011 |
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1. What Metaphors Mean |
James Grant, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, introduces some of the key concepts in discussions of metaphor in the philosophy of language. |
James Grant |
4 July, 2011 |
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Life and Death |
If a patient decides she doesn't want to live any longer, should she be allowed to die? Should she be allowed to kill herself? |
Peter Singer |
4 July, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 12 - 304b 6 - end |
Track 12 - 304b 6 - end - Hempel comments to Pratt. |
Christopher Kirwan |
21 June, 2011 |
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Moral Status |
A stone on the beach, we assume, has no moral status. We can kick or hammer the stone, and we have done the stone no harm. Typical adult human beings do have moral status. We shouldn't, without a very good reason, kick a man or woman. |
Jeff McMahan |
31 May, 2011 |
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Designer Babies |
The term 'designer baby' is usually used in a pejorative sense - to conjure up some dystopian Brave New World. There are already ways to affect what kind of children you have - most obviously by choosing the partner to have them with. |
Julian Savulescu |
31 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 11 - 300e 1 - 304b 5 |
Track 11 - 300e 1 - 304b 5 - Hempel is enmeshed. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 10 - 296e 4 - 300d 9 |
Track 10 - 296e 4 - 300d 9 - The same: Identity and predication. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 9 - 293b 1- 296e 3 |
Track 9 - 293b 1- 296e 3 - Hempel, the sophists, Clemons: Being competent (epistemon; have ability=epistasthai). |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 8 - 290e 1-293a 9 |
Track 8 - 290e1-293a9 - Hempel reports to Pratt, and then the encounter resumes. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 7 - 288b 3 - 290d 8 |
Track 7 288b 3 - 290d 8 - Hempel resumes with Valerie: Which mastery (episteme) is best? |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 6 - 285a 2-288b 2 |
Track 6 - 285a2-288 b2 - More with Clemons: Falsehood is impossible. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 5 - 282d 4 - 285a 1 |
Track 5 - 282d 4 - 285a 1 - the sophists tackle Hempel; Clemons is nettled. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 4 - 278e2-282d3 |
Track 4 - 278e2-282d3 - Hempel questions Valerie: Intelligence (sophia) alone is really good. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 3 - 275b 5 - 278e 1 |
Track 3 - 275b 5 - 278e 1 The sophists set to work on Valerie: Is learning possible? |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 2 - 272d 7 - 275b 4 |
Track 2 272d 7 - 275b 4 - Hempel inquires into the sophists' profession. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus part 1 - 271a 1 - 272d. 6 |
Track 1 -271a 1 - 272d. 6 - Pratt asks Hempel about the sophists. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Euthydemus introduction (PDF) |
Introductory document on the Euthydemus dialogue series. |
Christopher Kirwan |
24 May, 2011 |
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Designing Biotechnology |
James King, Lead Designer, Science Practice Ltd. gives a talk on Synthetic Biology - a new approach to genetics which applies engineering principles to biology in the hope of creating medicines, fuels, foods and other useful products. |
James King |
24 May, 2011 |
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The discipline of reason: The paralogisms and Antinomies of Pure Reason. |
Lecture 8/8. Reason, properly disciplined, draws permissible inferences from the resulting concepts of the understanding. The outcome is knowledge. |
Dan Robinson |
16 March, 2011 |
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The "Self" and the Synthetic Unity of Apperception |
Lecture 7/8. Kant argues that: "The synthetic unity of consciousness is... an objective condition of all knowledge. |
Dan Robinson |
16 March, 2011 |
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Concepts, judgement and the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories |
Lecture 6/8. Empiricists have no explanation for how we move from "mere forms of thought" to objective concepts. The conditions necessary for the knowledge of an object require a priori categories as the enabling conditions of all human understanding. |
Dan Robinson |
16 March, 2011 |
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Idealisms and their refutations |
Lecture 5/8. The very possibility of self-awareness (an "inner sense" with content) requires an awareness of an external world by way of "outer sense". Only through awareness of stable elements in the external world is self-consciousness possible. |
Dan Robinson |
16 March, 2011 |
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How are a priori synthetic judgements possible? |
Lecture 4/8. Kant claims that, "our sense representation is not a representation of things in themselves, but of the way in which they appear to us. |
Dan Robinson |
16 March, 2011 |
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Space, time and the "Analogies of Experiences" |
Lecture 3/8. Kant's so-called "Copernican" revolution in metaphysics begins with the recognition of the observer's contribution to the observation. |
Dan Robinson |
16 March, 2011 |
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The broader philosophical context |
Lecture 2/8. The significant advances in physics in the 17th century stood in vivid contrast to the stagnation of traditional metaphysics, but why should metaphysics be conceived as a "science" in the first place? |
Dan Robinson |
16 March, 2011 |
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Just what is Kant's "project"? |
Lecture 1/8. Both sense and reason are limited. Kant must identify the proper mission and domain of each, as well as the manner in which their separate functions come to be integrated in what is finally the inter-subjectively settled knowledge of science. |
Dan Robinson |
16 March, 2011 |
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8. Defining Art |
James Grant, lecturer in philosophy, University of Oxford gives his eight and final lecture in the Aesthetics series on Defining Art. |
James Grant |
15 March, 2011 |
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7. Musical Expression |
James Grant, lecturer in philosophy, University of Oxford gives his seventh lecture in the Aesthetics series on the expression of emotion in music. |
James Grant |
15 March, 2011 |
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6. Literary Interpretation |
James Grant, lecturer in philosophy, University of Oxford gives his sixth lecture in the Aesthetics series on the interpretation of literature. |
James Grant |
15 March, 2011 |
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5. Kant's Critique of Judgement: Lecture 2 |
James Grant, lecturer in philosophy, University of Oxford concludes his discussion of Kant's Critique of Judgement in the fifth lecture of the Aesthetics series. |
James Grant |
15 March, 2011 |
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4. Kant's Critique of Judgement: Lecture 1 |
James Grant, lecturer in philosophy, University of Oxford gives his fourth lecture in the Aesthetics series on Kant's Critique of Judgement. |
James Grant |
15 March, 2011 |
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3. Hume and the Standard of Taste |
James Grant, lecturer in philosophy, University of Oxford gives his third lecture in the Aesthetics series on Hume and the Standard of Taste. |
James Grant |
15 March, 2011 |
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2. Aristotle's Poetics |
James Grant, lecturer in philosophy, University of Oxford gives his second lecture in the Aesthetics series on Aristotle's Poetics. |
James Grant |
15 March, 2011 |
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1. Plato's Philosophy of Art |
James Grant, lecturer in philosop-hy, University of Oxford gives his first lecture in the Aesthetics series on Plato's philosophy of Art. |
James Grant |
15 March, 2011 |
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General Philosophy Lecture 8 |
PDF slides from Peter Millican's General Philosophy lecture 8. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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8.4 Persons, Humans and Brains |
Part 8.4. The final part of this series. Explores the distinction between mind and body and whether this makes a difference to the idea of personal identity. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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8.3 Problems for Locke's View of Personal Identity |
Part 8.3. Criticisms of Locke's view of personal identity; if personal identity is dependent on memory then how does forgetting personal history and the concept of false memory change Locke's view of personal identity. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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8.2 John Locke on Personal Identity |
Part 8.2. Looks at John Locke's view of personal identity; how consciousness and 'personal history' distinguish personal identity and the idea of memory as crucial for personal identity. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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8.1 Introduction to Personal Identity |
Part 8.1. Introduces the concept of personal identity, what is it to be a person, whether someone is the same person over time and Leibniz's law of sameness. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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General Philosophy Lecture 7 |
PDF slides from Peter Millican's General Philosophy lecture 7. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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7.4 Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility |
Part 7.4. A brief explanation of Hume's argument for sentimentalism and Robert Kane's views on free will and determinism. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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7.3 Hume on Liberty and Necessity |
Part 7.3. Looks at Hume's views on liberty and its relationship to causal necessity; that we have free will but it is causally determined. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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7.2 Different Concepts of Freedom |
Part 7.2. Looks at Hobbes' and Hume's views of free will and the three concepts of freedom, and considers the idea of moral responsibility as dependent on free will. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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7.1 Free Will, Determinism and Choice |
Part 7.1. Explores the problem of free will and the ideas of moral responsibility, determinism and choice; the need for a concept of freedom to allow free choice, the problems associated with this and asking whether we really have freedom of choice. |
Peter Millican |
1 December, 2010 |
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6.4 Making Sense of Perception |
Part 6.4. A brief overview of contemporary accounts of perception; including phenomenalism (that objects are logical constructions from sense data) and direct realism (that we perceive objects and the external world directly). |
Peter Millican |
30 November, 2010 |
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General Philosophy Lecture 6 |
PDF slides from Peter Millican's General Philosophy lecture 6. |
Peter Millican |
30 November, 2010 |
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6.3 Abstraction and Idealism |
Part 6.3. Criticisms of the resemblance theory of perception and an introduction to idealism - that perceptions of the external world are all within the mind as ideas. |
Peter Millican |
30 November, 2010 |
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6.2 Problems with Resemblance |
Part 6.2. Explores Berkeley's and Locke's arguments concerning the resemblance of qualities and objects; that the perceived qualities of objects exist only in the mind or whether secondary qualities are intrinsically part of the object. |
Peter Millican |
30 November, 2010 |
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6.1 Introduction to Primary and Secondary Qualities |
Part 6.1. Introduces the problem of perception (and the distinction between the world and what we perceive), along with the concepts of primary and secondary qualities. |
Peter Millican |
30 November, 2010 |
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