Skip to main content
Home

Main navigation

  • Home
  • Series
  • People
  • Depts & Colleges
  • Open Education

Main navigation

  • Home
  • Series
  • People
  • Depts & Colleges
  • Open Education

Michael Silberstein - Quantum mechanics and the consistency of conscious experience

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Michael Silberstein
Department of Philosophy, Elizabethtown College;
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland

We discuss the implications for the determinateness and intersubjective consistency of conscious experience in two gedanken experiments from quantum mechanics (QM). In particular, we discuss Wigner's friend and the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment with a twist. These are both cases (experiments) where quantum phenomena, or at least allegedly possible quantum phenomena/experiments, and the content/ecacy of conscious experience seem to bear on one another. We discuss why these two cases raise concerns for the determinateness and intersubjective consistency of conscious experience. We outline a 4D-global constraint-based approach to explanation in general and for QM in particular that resolves any such concerns without having to invoke metaphysical quietism (as with pragmatic accounts of QM), objective collapse mechanisms or subjective collapse. In short, we provide an account of QM free from any concerns associated with either the standard formalism or relative-state formalism, an account that yields a single 4D block universe with determinate and intersubjectively consistent conscious experience for all conscious agents.

Essentially the mystery in both experiments is caused by a dynamical/causal view of QM, e.g., time-evolved states in Hilbert space, and as we show this mystery can be avoided by a spatiotemporal, constraint-based view of QM, e.g., path integral calculation of probability amplitudes using future boundary conditions. What will become clear is that rather than furiously seeking some way to make dubious deep connections between quantum physics and conscious experience, the kinds of 4D adynamical global constraints that are fundamental to both classical and quantum physics and the relationship between them, also constrain conscious experience. That is, physics properly understood, already is psychology.

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Michael Silberstein
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:27:47

Subscribe

Download

Yakov Kremnitzer - Quantum collapse models and awareness

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Yakov Kremnitzer
Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford

In this talk I will explore how quantum collapse models can be a key to understanding awareness. I will explain the mathematical structure of quantum collapse models and give an example where collapse is caused by a quantum version of integrated information (this is joint with Andre Ranchin).

I will then look at the possibility of understanding awareness from collapse models and how this could be used to model consciousness as an emergent phenomenon (joint work in progress with Johannes Kleiner).

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Yakov Kremnitzer
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:56:14

Subscribe

Download

Adrian Kent - Searching for Physical Models of the Evolution of Consciousness

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Adrian Kent
Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Cambridge

The scientific consensus is that, although many important details remain to be elaborated, Darwinian evolution can be understood in principle as a consequence of known physical laws. As William James first pointed out, the development of human consciousness, and in particular the fact that it appears to have evolutionarily advantageous features, are hard to explain within a purely materialist Darwinian theory, according to which we would function equally well in the world if we were unconscious zombies or if pleasure and pain qualia were inverted. However, it is difficult to find attractive alternatives that have any more explanatory power. In this talk I describe toy models that are intended to illuminate the space of possibilities and the difficulties.

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Adrian Kent
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:50:37

Subscribe

Download

Ian Durham - Toward a formal model of free will

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Ian Durham
Saint Anselm College

Most discussions around the nature of free will center on whether or not it exists or can exist. Lost in this argument is the fact that we at least perceive that free will exists, whether or not it actually does. This is an important distinction. If we take an operational view of perceived free will, we can construct meaningful measures for analyzing ensembles of possible choices. I present such a formal model here that is based on statistical emergence and that gives concrete, formal measures of free choices and free will.

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Ian Durham
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:30:07

Subscribe

Download

Peter Lloyd - Automata-theoretic approach to modelling consciousness within mental monism

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Peter Lloyd
School of Computing, University of Kent

There has been a recent resurgence of interest in mental monism as a theory of consciousness (Goldschmidt & Pearce 2017, Chalmers 2017, 2018), and Lloyd (2006, 2019) has defended a form of Berkeleyanism that aligns with Pearce (2014) and Schrödinger’s (1958) “physical construct”.

Unlike theories that take the conscious mind to supervene on the brain, mental monism faces the burden of constructing ab initio the structure and dynamics of the conscious mind without any physical substrate to fall back on. Little work has been done on modelling the constituents of the mind at this fundamental level, under the tenets of mental monism. Energy, which is the driver of the physical world, has no counterpart in the mental world, which operates informatically instead. An automata-theoretic approach to modelling the conscious mind within mental monism is therefore a natural choice to explore. The model is constrained by (a) the mind’s interaction with other minds including the background consciousness, an interaction that must be mapped onto quantum mechanical measurement in the physical construct; and (b) the basic features of a mind such as individuation, privacy, mental space, psychological embodiment, attention, memory. What do these constraints imply for any substrate-free automata-theoretic model of consciousness?

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Peter Lloyd
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:16:37

Subscribe

Download

Tim Palmer - Creativity and Consciousness: A Consequence of the Brain’s Extraordinary Energy Efficiency?

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Tim Palmer
Department of Physics, University of Oxford

This talk is in two parts. In the first part, I suggest that creativity arises from a close synergy between two modes of neuronal operation (corresponding to Kahnemann’s Systems 1 and 2) where in the first, the limited amount of available energy to the brain is spread across large numbers of active neuronal networks, making them susceptible to noise; and in the second, available energy is focussed on smaller subset of active networks, making them operate more deterministically. In the second part, I define consciousness in terms of an ability to perceive an object as independent of its surroundings.

This implies an ability to perceive counterfactual worlds where objects are perturbed relative to their surroundings. I argue that such perception may require quantum theoretic processes to be operating in the brain, since the very formulation of quantum theory (whether in convention or unconventional interpretations) involves the primacy of states of alternate worlds - alive and dead cats and so on. I argue that the brain’s reliance on such quantum processes may have arisen because they are more energy efficient than corresponding classical processes, and give some examples to justify this. Overall, I argue that human creativity and consciousness may have arisen from the brain’s evolution to become an organ of exceptional energy efficiency.

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Tim Palmer
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:42:35

Subscribe

Download

Jonathan Mason - Expected Float Entropy Minimisation: A Relationship Content Theory of Consciousness

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Jonathan Mason
Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford

Over recent decades several complementary mathematical theories of consciousness have been put forward including Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle and Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory. In contrast to these, in this talk I present the theory of Expected Float Entropy minimisation (EFE minimisation) which is an attempt to explain how the brain defines the
content of consciousness up to relationship isomorphism and has been around since 2012. EFE involves a version of conditional Shannon Entropy parameterised by relationships. For systems with bias due to learning, such as various cortical regions, certain choices for the relationship parameters are isolated since giving much lower EFE values than others and, hence, the system defines relationships. It is proposed that, in the context of all these relationships, a brain state acquires meaning in the form of the relational content of the associated experience.

In its simplest form involving only “primary relationships” EFE minimisation can also be considered as a generalisation of the initial topology (i.e. weak topology). For us the family of functions involved are the typical (probable) system states, the common domain of these functions is the set of system nodes (e.g. neurons, tuples of neurons or larger structures) and the common codomain is the set of node states. In the case of the initial topology a topology is already assumed on the common codomain and the initial topology is then the coarsest topology on the common domain for which the functions are continuous. In our case no structure is assumed on either the domain or codomain. Instead EFE minimisation simultaneously finds structures (for us weighted graphs, but topologies could in principle be used) on both the domain and codomain such that the functions are close (in some suitable sense) to being continuous whilst avoiding trivial solutions (such as the two element trivial topology) for which arbitrary improbable functions (system states) would also be continuous. Thus we find the primary relational structures that the system itself defines. In this context objects (visual and auditory) are present and EFE then extends to secondary relationships between such objects by involving correlation for example. To aid application of the theory, computationally cheaper surrogates for EFE are being developed.

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Jonathan Mason
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:45:51

Subscribe

Download

Aaron Sloman - Why current AI and neuroscience fail to replicate or explain ancient forms of spatial reasoning and mathematical consciousness?

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Aaron Sloman
School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK

Most recent discussions of consciousness focus on a tiny subset of loosely characterized examples of human consciousness, ignoring evolutionary origins and transitions, the diversity of human and non-human phenomena, the variety of functions of consciousness, including consciousness of: possibilities for change, constraints on those possibilities, and implications of the possibilities and constraints -- together enabling extraordinary spatial competences in many species (e.g. portia spiders, squirrels, crows, apes) and, in humans, mathematical consciousness of spatial possibilities/impossibilities/necessities, discussed by Immanuel Kant (1781). (James Gibson missed important details.)

These are products of evolution's repeated discovery and use, in evolved construction-kits, of increasingly complex types of mathematical structure with constrained possibilities, used to specify new species with increasingly complex needs and behaviours, using lower-level impossibilities (constraints) to support higher level possibilities and necessities, employing new biological mechanisms that require more sophisticated information-based control. Such transitions produce new layers of control requirements: including acquisition and use of nutrients and other resources, reproductive processes, physical and informational development in individual organisms, and recognition and use of possibilities for action and their consequences by individuals, using layered mixtures of possibilities and constraints in the environment, over varying spatial and temporal scales (e.g. sand-castles to cranes and cathedrals).

I'll try to show how all this relates to aspects of mathematical consciousness noticed by Kant, essential for creative science and engineering as well as everyday actions, and also involved in spatial cognition used in ancient mathematical discoveries. In contrast, mechanisms using statistical evidence to derive probabilities cannot explain these achievements, and modern logic (unavailable to ancient mathematicians, and non-human species) lacks powerful heuristic features of spatial mathematical reasoning. New models of computation may be required, e.g. sub-neural chemistry-based computation with its mixture of discreteness and continuity (see recent work by Seth Grant).

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Aaron Sloman
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:22:31

Subscribe

Download

Pedro Resende - Sketches of a mathematical theory of qualia

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Pedro Resende
Técnico Lisboa

I present a mathematical definition of qualia from which a toy model of consciousness is derived, partly as an attempt to provide a mathematical formulation of the theory of qualia and concepts put forward by C.I. Lewis in 1929. This formulation is guided by the identification of basic principles that convey abstract aspects of the behavior of physical devices that “detect” qualia, such as brains of animals seem to do. The ensuing notion of space of qualia consists of a topological space Q equipped with additional algebraic structure that yields a notion of subjective time and makes Q a so-called stably Gelfand quantale. This leads to interesting conceptual consequences. For instance, “stable observers” emerge naturally and relate closely to the perception of space, which here, contrary to time, is not a primitive notion; and logical versions of quantum superposition and complementarity are obtained. Indeed a mathematical relation exists to quantum theory via operator algebras, due to which a space of qualia can also be regarded as an algebraic and topological model of quantum measurements.

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Pedro Resende
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:19:56

Subscribe

Download

Peter Grindrod - Large scale simulations of information processing within the human cortex: what “inner life” occurs?

Series
Models of Consciousness
Embed
One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference.
Peter Grindrod (joint research with Christopher Lester)
Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford

We seek to model the human cortex with 1B to 10B neurones arranged in a directed and highly modular network (a network of networks); with the tightly coupled modules (each containing 10,000 neurones or so) representing the cortical “columns”. Each neurone has an excitable and refectory dynamic and the neurone-to-neurone connections incur individual time delays. Thus the whole is a massive set of modular delay-differential equations (expensive to solve on a binary computer, but easily implemented within 1.5kg of neural wet- ware). Our early work has shown why evolution has resulted in such a design to ensure optimal use of the limited space and energy available. Indeed we can show that if the time delays were all integers rather than reals then much of the potential behaviour (dynamical degrees of freedom) would be lost.

Simulating a 1B neurone directed graph produces its own big data challenge. We focus on the inner life of these complex dynamical system, and show that the dynamical responses to external stimuli result in distinct, latent (internal), dynamic “states" or modes. These inner subjective and private states govern the immediate dynamical responses to further incoming stimuli. Hence they are candidates for internal “feelings”. So, what is it like to be a human? A human brain must also possess such inertial dynamical states, and a human brain can experience being within them: they are natural and necessary byproducts of the system's architecture and dynamics, and they suggest that the "hard problem of consciousness” is mainly explicable, and can be anticipated, in terms of network science and dynamical systems theory.

The numerical simulation at such large scales requires a special computing platform, such as SpiNNaker (at the University of Manchester). We will set out
the methodology to be deployed in (i) defining such complex systems; (ii) in simulating the spiking behaviour being passed around when such a system is subject to various stimuli; and (iii) the post processing - reverse engineering - of the whole system performance, to demonstrate that internal states/modes exist. We cannot reverse engineer a real human brain at the neurone-to- neurone level, but we can do so for such ambitious simulations.

Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.
Creative Commons Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK (BY-NC-SA): England & Wales; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

Episode Information

Series
Models of Consciousness
People
Peter Grindrod
Keywords
oxford
computer science
consciousness
neuroscience
mathematics
Department: Department of Computer Science
Date Added: 13/10/2019
Duration: 00:43:31

Subscribe

Download

Pagination

  • First page
  • Previous page
  • …
  • Page 1646
  • Page 1647
  • Page 1648
  • Page 1649
  • Page 1650
  • Page 1651
  • Page 1652
  • Page 1653
  • Page 1654
  • …
  • Next page
  • Last page

Footer

  • About
  • Accessibility
  • Contribute
  • Copyright
  • Contact
  • Privacy
  • Login
'Oxford Podcasts' X Account @oxfordpodcasts | Upcoming Talks in Oxford | © 2011-2026 The University of Oxford