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The media files for this episode are hosted on another site. Download the video here. Download the audio here.

Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis

A discussion of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model.
Platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content - and application providers on the Internet. When access is monopolized, for reasonable parameter ranges, net neutrality regulation (requiring zero fees to content providers) increases the total industry surplus as compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content providers. However, there are also parameter ranges for which total industry surplus is reduced. Imposing net neutrality in duopoly with multi-homing content providers and single-homing consumers increases the total surplus as compared to duopoly competition with positive fees to content providers.

Episode Information

People
Nicholas Economides
Keywords
surplus
consumers
monopoly
industry
net neutrality
access
regulation
Governance
competition
internet
policy
content provider
market
Department: 
Date Added: 08/03/2010
Duration: 01:30:48

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